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Reducing unemployment and alleviating poverty are key policy goals
in many developing countries, yet progress remains elusive on both
fronts. Although the measurement of poverty and the use of interna-
tional poverty lines for cross-country comparisons have generated much
controversy in recent years (see Deaton, 2001, 2003; Ravallion, 2003),
there is some agreement that poverty remains high in many parts of
the world and has even increased in some countries. Figure 1 displays
the behavior of the headcount ratio, which measures the incidence of
poverty (that is, the proportion of individuals or households earning
less than a given level of income), in various regions of the developing
world, using international poverty lines of $1.08 and $2.16 a day.1 World
Bank data show that between 1990 and 1999, poverty rates fell signifi-
cantly in East Asia and the Pacific, but they increased in Europe, Cen-
tral Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, while countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa re-
corded very little progress. According to the United Nations, poverty
rates (measured by the proportion of a country’s people living below
$1.08 a day) increased in the 1990s in thirty-seven out of sixty-seven
countries for which data were available (UNDP, 2003).2 Projections for
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1. Let y* be the poverty line; the headcount ratio is defined as PH = n/N,
where n is the number of households below the poverty line and N is the total
number of households.
2. Fifty-four countries also recorded an average growth rate below zero for
the last decade, and twenty-one countries experienced a drop in the human devel-
opment index (a more comprehensive measure of welfare calculated by the United
Nations, which includes life expectancy and literacy). Twelve countries registered
a decline in primary school enrollment rates, and fourteen countries recorded an
increase in child mortality.
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2015 based on current trends indicate that prospects remain bleak for
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Unemployment has also become a great source of concern. Women
and the young have been particularly hard hit, because their jobs are
highly vulnerable to adverse economic shocks. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) estimates that the number of unemployed work-
ers worldwide grew by 20 million between the beginning of 2001 and
the end of 2002, to reach a record level of 180 million (ILO, 2003). As
shown in figure 2, only in transition economies did unemployment
rates fall in recent years. They remain well above 10 percent in sev-
eral countries—and are even close to 20 percent in Bulgaria, Poland,
the Slovak Republic, and the former Yugoslavia—despite strong eco-
nomic growth in recent years.3 In Latin America, many countries (in-
cluding those with sustained growth) have experienced major increases
in unemployment: the unemployment rate doubled to more than 10
percent in Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s. In the Middle East and
North Africa, the population nearly quadrupled during the second half
of the past century, and employment growth failed to keep pace with
the resulting expansion of the labor force in the 1980s and 1990s.
3. Unemployment was nonexistent at the beginning of the 1990s in Central
and Eastern Europe, but it jumped to about 15 percent of the labor force in the
early phases of the transition to a market economy.
Figure 1. Poverty Headcount Index, 1990–2015
Source: World Bank.
a. Projections.
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Consequently, the Middle East and North Africa recorded some of the
highest unemployment rates among developing regions in the 1990s.
According to the ILO, unemployment rates range from less than
3 percent in the United Arab Emirates to close to 30 percent in Alge-
ria. In 2001, the number of unemployed in the region—mostly the
young (or first-time job seekers) and women—was estimated to be over
22 million, or 17.6 percent of the labor force.4 Based on current trends,
prospects remain bleak. The United Nations estimates that the popu-
lation in the Middle East and North Africa is likely to continue to grow
faster than in any other region between 2000 and 2015; the labor force
is expected to grow at a rate of about 3 percent, such that unemploy-
ment could exceed 25 million by the year 2010 (UNDP, 2002).
Unemployment reduction and poverty alleviation are often viewed
as complementary policy goals that involve no tradeoffs. This is not
always the case, however. The experience of recent years shows that
vulnerable groups (namely, young people, older workers, women, and
the unskilled) frequently benefited little from improvements in aggre-
gate macroeconomic conditions, and they often ended up in poorly paid
jobs. In Latin America, the share of the so-called working poor (that is,
workers who earn less than the $1.08-a-day international poverty
line) in total employment rose significantly in many countries.
4. In Egypt, for instance, the unemployment rate for women (22.6 percent) is
four times that of men, and in Jordan it is almost double. The youth unemploy-
ment rate is almost 39 percent in Algeria and exceeds 73 percent in Syria (ILO,
2003). The World Bank (2004) reports a regional unemployment rate of 14.9
percent for 2000–01, with 20 million unemployed.
Figure 2. Unemployment Rates by Region, 2000–02
Source: International Labor Organization.
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In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, measured unemployment re-
mains relatively low, yet the share of the working poor in total em-
ployment averaged almost 40 percent in both regions, reaching 50
percent in India (ILO, 2003) (see figure 3). In the Middle East and
North Africa, the proportion of working poor is also high, as is the
case, for instance, in Morocco and Syria. A potential tradeoff between
unemployment reduction and poverty alleviation is thus readily ap-
parent: to the extent that the increased growth rates of output and
job creation that are needed to absorb the increased labor supply and
reduce unemployment require a significant drop in real wages, the
deterioration in living standards may lead to a rise in poverty.
Various other sources of potential tradeoffs between reducing pov-
erty and lowering unemployment may arise in both the short and the
long term. This paper provides a systematic assessment of the factors
that may entail an arbitrage between these two key policy goals. Sec-
tion 1 presents a broad analytical discussion of the conditions that may
trigger unemployment-poverty tradeoffs, focusing in particular on the
role of labor market reforms such as a cut in payroll taxes on unskilled
labor, a reduction in the minimum wage, and a reduction in firing
costs. Section 2 proposes two econometric techniques for empirically
assessing the importance of unemployment-poverty tradeoffs. The first
is based on a vector autoregression (VAR) model linking the cyclical
components of output, real wages, unemployment, and poverty.
Figure 3. Proportion of Working Poora
Source: International Labor Organization.
a. The working poor are workers who do not earn enough to lift themselves and
their families above the US$1.08-a-day poverty line.
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The second involves cross-country regressions of the determinants of
poverty rates, with the unemployment rate among the explanatory vari-
ables. Section 3 proposes a third approach, based on a simulation model
that integrates a structural macroeconomic component and a house-
hold survey to assess the impact of policy shocks on unemployment and
poverty. The analysis focuses on labor market reforms as a source of
shocks and studies their impact on the composition of both unemploy-
ment (skilled and unskilled) and poverty (with a distinction between
various categories of urban households). Many economists regard labor
market rigidities as being a major obstacle to an expansion of employ-
ment in the formal economy and a reduction of urban poverty, which
tends to be concentrated in the informal sector.5 At the same time, the
possible existence of tradeoffs between unemployment and poverty re-
duction has received scant attention in the analytical literature focus-
ing on these reforms. The framework presented in this paper is
particularly useful because it allows a description of the transitional
dynamics induced by policy shocks. It is therefore possible to assess not
only whether such shocks entail the existence of a short-term tradeoff
between unemployment and poverty reduction, but also whether this
tradeoff tends to persist over time. The last part of the paper offers
some concluding remarks and identifies some research perspectives.
1. SOURCES OF TRADEOFFS
At the level of an individual country, a tradeoff between poverty
and unemployment can surface either at the aggregate (economy-
wide) level or at the level of individual household groups (for instance,
urban households). Tradeoffs at both levels may entail a temporal
dimension, in the sense that they may emerge in the short term but
vanish in the long run (or vice versa). This section analyzes the con-
ditions under which aggregate and partial tradeoffs between unem-
ployment and poverty may arise. It also draws the implications of the
analysis for predicting and interpreting the correlation between these
two variables across countries.
As noted earlier, an obvious reason for an inverse correlation (or
the lack thereof) between poverty and unemployment is based on the
possibility that reducing unemployment requires a fall in real wages;
5. See, for instance, Saavedra (2003) for a review of the Latin American
experience with labor market reform in the 1990s.120 Pierre-Richard Agénor
this lowers real income and therefore leads to an increase in poverty.
The tradeoff may be particularly steep if the expansion in employ-
ment (induced by lower real wages and output growth) is skewed
toward low-paying jobs. The increase in the number of working poor
appears consistent with this interpretation, although the concomi-
tant increase in unemployment observed in some countries would
suggest that real wages did not fall sufficiently or that the labor sup-
ply expanded simultaneously. Put differently, an increase in the num-
ber of working poor induced by lower wages does not necessarily imply
an inverse correlation between poverty and unemployment; it de-
pends on the magnitude of the fall in wages and on the strength of
the “encouragement effect” associated with higher growth and em-
ployment on participation rates.
This discussion suggests, however, that unemployment and pov-
erty are jointly endogenous—and if unemployment and poverty are
simultaneously determined, the correlation between them will be
driven by factors that are likely to vary over time or across coun-
tries, depending on the sources of shocks that prove to be dominant.
Although adverse wage shocks may be an important source of nega-
tive correlation between unemployment and poverty over time (and
across countries or regions), other sources of shocks to labor demand
may also matter. In general, if the economy’s aggregate production
function is not separable in (all) inputs, the demand for labor will
depend not only on the cost of labor, but also on all the variables
other than labor affecting output, including overall productivity and
inputs such as physical capital and imported raw materials. Produc-
tivity shocks, in particular, may also affect the unemployment-pov-
erty correlation, either positively or negatively. A positive productivity
shock, for instance, may raise labor demand and put upward pres-
sure on wages, thereby lowering both unemployment and poverty (if
the increase in the wage rate is sufficient to raise it above the pov-
erty line). But if wages cannot adjust as a result, say, of a binding
minimum wage, then the number of working poor may rise. In that
case, although unemployment may fall, overall poverty rates may
increase if the minimum wage is below the poverty line.
The underlying source of these shocks (whether to wages or pro-
ductivity) may be policy induced, rather than the result of purely
random disturbances. Consequently, changes in real wages and pro-
ductivity may themselves be endogenous and may need to be ana-
lyzed jointly with changes in poverty and unemployment. Policies
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entail a tradeoff between unemployment and poverty, through their
impact on wages and labor demand. Labor market regulations, par-
ticularly job security provisions, have been shown to have a major im-
pact on both the level and distribution of employment in many
developing countries.6 An increase in employment subsidies, for in-
stance, may have a direct, beneficial impact on unskilled employ-
ment; at the same time, it may increase poverty if it is financed by an
increase in the sales tax on goods sold domestically, because of the
impact of the tax hike on the cost of living. Thus, although the sub-
sidy may increase the nominal (and product) wage of the unskilled,
their real (consumption) wage may fall. The impact may be particu-
larly large for the poorest households in urban areas, depending on the
exact nature of the tax that is used to offset the impact of the increase
in spending on the budget (whether it is indeed an increase in the sales
tax or a rise in income tax on individuals or firms) and on the composi-
tion of household spending. It is possible for poverty to increase in the
informal sector (because workers in that sector bear the brunt of the
increase in consumer prices, for instance), while at the same time un-
skilled unemployment falls in the formal economy.
A reduction in the payroll tax on unskilled labor (a policy that is
often advocated to reduce unemployment) may have similar results. If
the reduction in the payroll tax is financed by a mixture of higher taxes
on domestic goods and corporate income, and if the reduction in the
net rate of return on physical capital accumulation lowers investment
incentives, then the net effect on employment may be mitigated. The
demand for labor may not increase over time as much as it would
otherwise because of the gross complementarity between capital and
labor. Unemployment may thus fall to a limited extent, whereas pov-
erty among the most vulnerable urban groups may increase signifi-
cantly—again, because higher taxes on domestic goods have a large
impact on the cost of living faced by that category of households.
Even labor market reforms that do not have a direct impact on
the government budget may entail a tradeoff between unemployment
and poverty, as a result of their indirect, general equilibrium effects.
A cut in the minimum wage, for instance, may indeed increase the
demand for unskilled labor in the urban formal sector; poverty may
increase, however, if the cut is large and the elasticity of demand for
that category of labor is not high. To the extent that the cut in the
6. See Heckman and Pagés (2000) and Saavedra (2003) for the case of Latin
America.122 Pierre-Richard Agénor
minimum wage reduces the expected wage (because the employment
ratio does not rise sufficiently to offset the reduction in labor income),
it may also lower the incentive to queue for employment in the for-
mal economy. Consequently, the supply of labor in the informal sec-
tor may increase, thereby putting downward pressure on wages there.
Urban poverty rates may therefore increase, although in general the
effect is ambiguous.7
In a growth context, an ambiguous correlation between unem-
ployment and poverty may also emerge from the combination of an
inverse correlation between growth and poverty (a sufficient condi-
tion for which is a distribution-neutral growth process) and an am-
biguous relationship between growth and unemployment, depending
on the source of the underlying shock. The source of ambiguity is
well illustrated in a simplified version of the model developed by Bean
and Pissarides (1993), which considers a two-period economy with
overlapping generations and a constant population.8 Suppose that
production in each individual firm in this economy, Yt, exhibits con-
stant returns to scale in the firm’s capital, Kt, and diminishing
returns to labor:
where 0 < α  < 1 and
with Nt denoting the firm’s employment level and     the economy-
wide stock of capital (which is treated as given by individual firms).
Capital depreciates fully in a single period. Technology thus exhibits
positive externalities, in Romer-like fashion.
Potential workers and employers have to search for each other,
with the number of successful matches increasing in both the num-
ber of unemployed and the number of job vacancies. This matching
process takes place at the start of the period, and individuals who fail
to find a job then have no chance to reenter the labor market later.
Given the generational structure, this implies that all matches last









7. The transmission process of a cut in the minimum wage is studied more
formally in the context of the structural model described later.
8. The simplifications involve abstracting from intertemporal considerations
in household decisions and choosing a specific functional form for the production
technology.
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exactly one period. The matching technology for aggregate employment,
     , may thus be written as
where   , is the aggregate number of job openings at the start of
period t and Lt is the number of young households. The matching
function is concave, homogeneous of degree one, and increasing in
both arguments.9 These properties can be summarized by the follow-
ing restrictions:
Because the population is constant, one can set Lt = 1 and sup-
press it in what follows, so that
Thus,      (or, respectively,      – 1) can be interpreted as the economy-
wide employment (or unemployment) rate.
Hires by an individual firm, Nt, are proportional to the number of
vacancies it has relative to the aggregate, that is,
Households are endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied
inelastically in the first period of life. Their propensity to save when
young is assumed constant and equal to 0 < γ  < 1. In the second
period of their lives, households become entrepreneurs and invest
directly. A firm’s profits, Π t, are given by
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9. Concavity is assumed in order to capture a congestion externality in the
labor market. The higher the number of vacancies opened by firms, the shorter is
the search effort of unemployed workers; and the more unemployed workers
searching for jobs in the labor market, the faster is the match available for each
firm.
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where wt is the wage rate and qt is the hiring cost per job opening,
which is assumed to be proportional to the economy-wide capital stock,
:10
The wage is determined after a match has occurred, as the out-
come of a Nash bargain between the firm and the individual worker.
Workers can only work at one firm, and if both parties fail to reach
agreement, neither has the opportunity to look for an alternative
match elsewhere.11 The firm’s utility is linear in the marginal profit
from employing an additional worker, that is, using equation (1),
Thus, using the wage rate as a measure of the worker’s surplus, and
assuming that the unemployed receive no benefit and have no alter-
native source of income, the wage must satisfy
where 0 < β  < 1 measures the worker’s bargaining strength. This
equation yields the first-order condition
from which the equilibrium wage can be derived as
t K
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10. In this setting only firms incur a cost to match workers with their opened
vacancies; workers passively wait for a match, comparing their prospective in-
come with the opportunity cost of being unemployed. An alternative approach,
following King and Welling (1995), would be to assume that workers bear a direct
cost when they decide to actively search for a job. This assumption would be more
appropriate for developing economies, where the lack of adequate institutions in
the labor market may create informational frictions.
11. This assumption can be relaxed (by assuming instead that it is costly for
each agent to change an alternative match) without affecting qualitatively the
main results of the model.
(6)
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Substituting equation (6) into equation (4) and eliminating Vt us-
ing equations (2) and (3), together with equations (1) and (5), yields
The firm’s optimal choice of nt thus satisfies
With a large number of identical firms, and in general equilibrium,
Kt =     , Nt =     , and nt = Nt. The above expression thus becomes
which equates the marginal product of labor to an expression that cap-
tures both the marginal cost of matching capital and labor and the
strategic use of employment by the firm to affect the outcome of the
wage bargain (high employment lowers the marginal product and thus
also the wage).
Finally, the evolution of the capital stock is determined by the
savings of the young, that is, given the assumption of a full deprecia-
tion of capital, Kt+1 = γ wtNt. Using equation (6) with Kt =     and
Nt =      yields
The growth rate of output (or, equivalently here, output per capita)
along a balanced growth path with a constant employment rate is
Kt+1/Kt – 1, which is obtained from equation (8). Thus, equations (7)
and (8) determine the economy’s equilibrium in terms of the employ-
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This framework can be used to analyze the impact of various changes
in the parameters along balanced growth paths.12 A reduction in hir-
ing costs, χ, raises employment, the rate of capital formation, and
growth. An increase in the propensity to consume (a reduction in γ )
lowers the growth rate but has no effect on employment. The first
experiment predicts a negative empirical (cross-sectional) relation be-
tween growth and unemployment—and thus a positive relation be-
tween the latter variable and poverty—if differences in growth rates
are primarily due to differences in hiring costs across countries. By
contrast, no systematic relation should be observed if cross-country
differences result from differences in saving rates.13
An increase in the relative bargaining strength of workers, β , has
two opposite effects. On the one hand, from equation (7), it tends to
reduce employment and the growth rate, under reasonable condi-
tions.14 On the other, it tends to increase the growth rate, with no
effect on employment. The effect on growth is thus ambiguous. Intu-
itively, these two effects can be explained as follows. On the one hand,
the increase in bargaining strength shifts income from entrepreneurs
(who consume all their income here) to workers, which raises sav-
ings and fosters growth. On the other, provided that the strategic
effect is not too strong, unemployment rises, thereby reducing work-
ers’ income and the available pool of savings and dampening growth.
The overall impact on growth (and thus poverty) depends on which
effect dominates.
The recent growth literature features several other models that may
lead to a negative correlation between unemployment and poverty, as a
12. Exercises of this type are complicated, in general, because changes in
parameters will generally affect the rate of return and thus the propensity to
save. However, these changes are simpler to analyze here because of the assump-
tion of a constant saving rate.
13. In the present framework, an exogenous reduction in the saving rate has
the conventional classical effect of lowering investment and reducing the growth
rate. Bean and Pissarides (1993) develop a two-sector extension of this model
based on imperfect competition in the consumption goods sector, which implies (in
the Keynesian tradition) that an increase in the propensity to consume raises
both investment and growth.
14. This is most easily shown if the matching technology involves constant
elasticity of substitution (CES), that is,
with ρ > 0. The resulting equation (7) may yield multiple solutions, but the implicit
function theorem can be used to show that an increase in β  does reduce employment.
()
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result of a nonlinear relation between unemployment and growth.
These models include Aghion and Howitt (1994), Cahuc and Michel
(1996), van Schaik and de Groot (1995), and Aricó (2003). In the Aghion-
Howitt framework, for instance, an increase in the growth rate of
productivity raises the present discounted value of the profits from
opening a new job, which leads firms to open more vacancies and
thus reduces unemployment. This is what they call a capitalization
effect. At the same time, when productivity growth occurs through
the creative destruction of low-productivity jobs and their replace-
ment by new high-productivity ones elsewhere in the economy, then
the inflow rate into unemployment will also be increased. This is
termed the reallocation effect, which affects workers in the opposite
direction of the capitalization effect. Aghion and Howitt show that
the reallocation effect dominates at low growth rates, whereas the
capitalization effect dominates at high ones, leading to a hump-shaped
relation between growth and unemployment. Although the foregoing
analysis is based on a causal effect from growth to unemployment
(instead of the presumption that growth and unemployment are jointly
determined, as emphasized by Bean and Pissarides, 1993), its main
point is similar to the one made earlier: tradeoffs between unemploy-
ment and poverty reduction may emerge as a result of policy or struc-
tural shocks.
In practice, labor is heterogeneous, and households differ in terms
of their sources of income. This implies that any analysis of unem-
ployment must take into account its composition; similarly, changes
in poverty rates must be examined not only at the aggregate level,
but also at the level of various household groups. A policy-induced
shock may entail a tradeoff solely between unemployment of one cat-
egory of workers (say, unskilled workers) and one particular group of
households (say, households in the urban informal sector). Consider,
for instance, a reduction in the minimum wage, as discussed earlier;
to the extent that the wage cut leads formal sector firms to substi-
tute away from skilled labor (which has a higher degree of comple-
mentary with physical capital than with unskilled labor), skilled
unemployment may increase at the same time that unskilled unem-
ployment falls. In such conditions, the nature of the social welfare
function becomes crucial in choosing a given policy path. The simula-
tion framework presented below will help to illustrate partial tradeoffs
of this nature.128 Pierre-Richard Agénor
2. ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUES
In this section, I use two alternative econometric techniques to
assess empirically the importance of potential tradeoffs between un-
employment and poverty. The first technique focuses on short-run
dynamics; it is based on a vector autoregression (VAR) model involving
a small set of stationary variables, which includes unemployment and
poverty. The second involves cross-country regressions of poverty rates
on a variety of structural and macroeconomic variables, with unem-
ployment being among the explanatory variables.
2.1 A VAR Framework
A first approach to determining whether unemployment and pov-
erty move in opposite directions in response to shocks in the short
term is to specify a parsimonious VAR consisting of the detrended
components of output, the open unemployment rate, real wages, and
the poverty rate. These variables are chosen on the premise that in
the short term an output shock, for instance, is transmitted to pov-
erty primarily through two channels: either a change in unemploy-
ment or a change in real wages.15 In general, the impact of a shock
on poverty will depend on what group is hit the hardest by the rise in
unemployment or the fall in real wages. If movements in these two
variables primarily affect prime-age working males with low educa-
tion, poverty may increase significantly. The VAR may thus need to
include a measure of unemployment that closely reflects the labor
market conditions faced by young or unskilled workers (as a proxy
for vulnerable groups), and a real wage index that is representative
of wages earned by the poor—say, an index of unskilled workers’
wages or wages in the informal sector.
I applied this procedure to Brazil and Chile, using annual data in
both cases. The estimation period is 1981–2002 for Brazil and 1981–2001
for Chile. In both countries, the issue of assessing the impact of macro-
economic variables on poverty has received significant attention.
15. As noted by Agénor (2002a), output shocks may also be accompanied by
changes in intrafamily allocation of income or government transfers, which are
not captured by movements in wages. Moreover, changes in open unemployment
may not be highly correlated with output fluctuations, because adjustment to
changes in labor demand takes the form of large movements in the labor force
between the formal and informal sectors. Under such conditions, the open unem-
ployment rate should be replaced by a measure of the size of the informal sector.Unemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 129
Paes de Barros, Corseuil, and Leite (2000), for instance, in a study
based on microeconomic simulation techniques, find that unemploy-
ment has a major impact on the behavior of poverty rates in Brazil.
However, none of the existing studies address the issue of potential
tradeoffs between unemployment and poverty.
For both countries, I estimate the trend component of each vari-
able by using a modified version of the ideal band pass filter of Baxter
and King (1999), as proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). The
Baxter-King filter is a linear transformation of the data, which leaves
intact the components within a specified band of frequencies and elimi-
nates all other components. Its application requires a large amount
of data, however. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) propose the follow-
ing approximation. Let yt be the data series that would result from
applying the ideal band pass filter to the raw data, xt. Then yt is ap-
proximated by    , which is a filter of xt, with weights chosen to mini-
mize the mean square error:
Specifically,     is computed as
for t = 1, 2, 4,…, T, where
and         and        are linear functions of the values of Bj
and        solves
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Consider first the case of Brazil. The variables included in the VAR,
which are defined more precisely in appendix A, are the (log of the)
output gap and the cyclical components of the (log of the) aggregate
unemployment rate, the real minimum wage, and the poverty gap,
defined as the average shortfall of the income of the poor with respect
to the national poverty line, multiplied by the headcount ratio (as de-
fined earlier).16 The real minimum wage plays a key role in the distri-
bution of wages in Brazil (as noted, for instance, by Neri and Thomas,
2000), and it is a good proxy for the unskilled real wage, as time-series
comparisons indicate that these two series are highly correlated.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) stationary tests indicated that
all the variables, as defined here, are stationary.17 A standard VAR
approach (that is, one that ignores cointegrating relationships be-
tween the variables in level form) can therefore be used.18 Figure 4
shows the evolution of the cyclical components of all the variables
included in the VAR. The data illustrate fairly well the pro-cyclical
behavior of the real minimum wage and the counter-cyclical behav-
ior of unemployment and poverty.
Variables in the VAR are ordered as follows: output gap—real
minimum wage—unemployment rate—poverty rate. The fact that
the output gap and the unemployment rate are placed before the
poverty rate in the VAR captures the assumption that shocks to pov-
erty have no contemporaneous impact on these variables. Any con-
temporaneous correlation between a disturbance to the poverty rate
and the output gap, for instance, is thus taken to reflect causation
16. The poverty gap is defined as
where y* – yi measures, for individual i in poverty, the gap between income, yi,
and the poverty line, y*; L is the set of all poor; and n is the total number of poor.
17. The ADF test statistics were –3.418 for the cyclical component of the
poverty rate (significant at the 5 percent level, using MacKinnon critical values for
rejection of the null hypothesis), –2.978 for the detrended component of unem-
ployment (significant at the 10 percent level), –3.889 for the cyclical component of
the real minimum wage (significant at the 1 percent level), and –4.975 for the
detrended component of output (significant at the 1 percent level).
18. Alternatively, all variables in the VAR could be measured in levels, despite
being nonstationary. As shown by Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990), least-squares
estimates are consistent for the levels specification (whether or not cointegration
exists), whereas a differenced specification is inconsistent if some variables are
cointegrated. In the absence of cointegration, the estimated standard errors of the
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from output to poverty, and not the other way around.19 I used the
Akaike criterion to choose the optimal lag length. Given the rela-
tively small size of the sample, I only compared models with one and
two lags. The test led to the selection of one lag as the optimal choice.
The impulse response functions of the poverty gap and unemploy-
ment associated with a one-standard-deviation shock to the innovation
in all the variables included in the VAR are shown in figure 5. The solid
lines in the figures represent the impulse responses themselves,
whereas the dotted lines are the associated 95 percent upper and lower
confidence bands.20 An innovation in output lowers unemployment (as
Figure 4. Brazil: Cyclical Components of Real GDP,
Unemployment Rate, Real Wage, and Poverty Gap, 1976-2002a
a. The cyclical component of each variable is defined as the log difference of the variable from its trend value
calculated by using the Baxter-King filtering method.
19. Alternative orderings were also considered, with either the poverty rate
or the unemployment rate always appearing last in the sequence. The results
were virtually unchanged.
20. The confidence intervals were generated with EViews, using a procedure
based on analytical derivatives.Figure 5. Brazil: Impulse Response Functionsa
a. Cyclical components of each variable are used. The VAR model is estimated using a one-period lag.
Each innovation corresponds to one standard deviation of the respective variable.Unemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 133
expected) but has no statistically significant effect on poverty. An in-
novation in real wages has, again, no effect on poverty and a perverse
effect on unemployment in the first period. An innovation in the un-
employment rate raises unemployment, of course, with no effect on
poverty, whereas an innovation in the poverty gap has a positive and
significant effect on both variables.
Consider now the case of Chile. The variables included in the VAR
are the (log of the) output gap and the cyclical components of the (log of
the) urban unemployment rate, the real wage for unskilled labor, and
the headcount poverty index for the Santiago Metropolitan area.21 ADF
tests also indicated that all these variables are stationary.22 Figure 6
displays the cyclical components of all the variables. Although real
unskilled wages seem to fluctuate relatively little over time, they do
show some degree of procyclicality. Both unemployment and poverty
are countercyclical. Unemployment seems to fluctuate a lot more than
poverty, however, and in the 1990s the two variables appear to be
negatively correlated—an observation that would be consistent with a
tradeoff between them, despite the fact that the sample period is small.
Using the same ordering as before and uniformly selecting one lag
(based on the Akaike criterion), I calculated the impulse response func-
tions of the poverty gap and unemployment. The results, illustrated in
figure 7, indicate that a positive innovation in output lowers unem-
ployment and raises unskilled wages (again, as expected), but it has no
direct, discernible effect on poverty. An innovation in real wages has
no statistically significant effect on either one of the variables of the
system. Unemployment shocks have no significant impact on poverty,
and conversely poverty shocks do not affect unemployment.
Overall, therefore, the results for Brazil and Chile do not indicate
the existence of a short-term tradeoff between poverty reduction and
unemployment. This result may be due to a variety of factors, includ-
ing limitations in the data. For instance, the aggregate unemployment
rate was used in both cases, instead of the unskilled unemployment
rate; the latter would be more appropriate given the correlation be-
tween education and poverty levels. More advanced approaches might
21. More precise definitions of these variables are provided in appendix A.
The VAR model was also estimated with a measure of extreme poverty and with
an index of average wages in the urban sector. In both cases, the impulse re-
sponse functions obtained were very similar to those reported here.
22. The ADF test statistics were –4.479, –3.461, –3.022, and –3.064 for the
detrended components of, respectively, the poverty rate, the unemployment rate,
the real unskilled wage, and real GDP. All these statistics are significant at a 5
percent threshold or higher.134 Pierre-Richard Agénor
also provide different results. One line of investigation would be to
develop a structural VAR model, which would allow one to disentangle
the importance of, say, real wage shocks, as opposed to, say, productiv-
ity shocks, in the behavior of poverty and unemployment. Alterna-
tively, an error-correction framework would allow a possible distinction
between short- and longer-term tradeoffs. This could be important be-
cause the fact that output shocks appear to have no effect on poverty in
a VAR in which all variables are entered in detrended form does not
preclude the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the raw
output and poverty series themselves.
2.2 Cross-country Regressions
As noted earlier, if both unemployment and poverty are viewed as
jointly endogenous, a key issue then becomes to identify the ultimate
source of the differences in unemployment, growth, and poverty, either
over time (at the level of an individual country) or across countries.
Figure 6. Chile: Cyclical Components of Real GDP,
Unemployment Rate, Real Wage, and Poverty Gap, 1980-2001a
a. The cyclical component of each variable is defined as the log difference of the variable from its trend value
calculated by using the Baxter-King filtering method.Figure 7. Chile: Impulse Response Functionsa
a. Cyclical  components of each variable are used. The VAR model is estimated using a one-period lag.
Each innovation corresponds to one standard deviation of the respective variable.136 Pierre-Richard Agénor
Figure 8 displays data for a group of thirty-one developing countries on
two standard measures of poverty (the headcount index and the poverty
gap, both defined earlier) and the open unemployment rate. The num-
ber of countries corresponds to all those for which matching data were
obtained between the World Bank and the ILO databases on these vari-
ables. Each data point is an average of all available observations for each
country. The figure suggests a negative correlation (and thus a potential
tradeoff) between poverty and unemployment across countries. More-
over, a simple cross-section regression of poverty on unemployment (also
shown in the figure) suggests that the relation between these variables
is convex: the correlation appears to turn positive beyond a rate of un-
employment of about 20 percent—specifically, 3.551/(2*0.088) = 20.2 for
the headcount index, and 1.228/(2*0.03) = 20.5 for the poverty gap.
Source: World Bank Global Poverty Monitoring and ILO.
a. Samples consist of thirty-one countries for which data are available in the World Bank Global Poverty
Monitoring (www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/) and ILO.
b. Proportion of the population earning 1.08 US dollar or less a day, various survey years.
c. Poverty gap at 1.08 US dollar or less a day, various survey years.
Figure 8. Developing Countries: Unemployment and PovertyaUnemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 137
However, given the small number of data points in that range, it is
difficult to draw much from this increasing portion of the curve, de-
spite the statistical significance of the quadratic term in unemploy-
ment in the regression.
A simple explanation for the negative correlation between unemploy-
ment and poverty shown in the figure is that it reflects the fact that poor
countries often have a large informal sector, such that open (or officially
measured) unemployment tends to be small. At the same time, the urban
poor tend to be highly concentrated in the informal sector. Thus, a large
informal sector corresponds to a lower open unemployment rate (reflect-
ing higher disguised unemployment) and a higher poverty rate. There
are two problems, however, with this interpretation. First, it does not
appear to hold in some regions. In the Middle East and North Africa,
most notably, a good part of unemployment is voluntary in nature and
affects the educated. The link between unemployment and poverty thus
tends to be weak: the World Bank (2004) finds, using microeconomic
data, that poverty and labor market status are not closely correlated in
that region. Second, this interpretation does not appear to be sufficient; in
the cross-country econometric results discussed later, I control indirectly
for the size of the informal sector by using income per capita as a regres-
sor (the lower the standards of living, the larger is the size of the informal
economy), and the negative correlation between unemployment and pov-
erty persists.
To assess the relation between these two variables over time and
across countries, I specify and estimate a cross-country regression model,
using unbalanced panel data for a group of developing economies. The
dependent variable is either the headcount index or the poverty gap,
based on the international poverty line of $1.08 a day. Based on my
previous results (see Agénor, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a), I included the follow-
ing explanatory variables in the regressions, in addition to the unem-
ployment rate: INFL is the inflation rate in terms of consumer prices;
LGDPPC is the log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, which captures the level of
economic development and the effect of economic growth on standards
of living; REALEX is the rate of change of the real effective exchange
rate (defined such that an increase is a depreciation); VREALXL is a
measure of macroeconomic volatility, which consists of rolling standard
deviations of the real exchange rate; and TARIFF is the average tariff
rate (total tariff revenue divided by the value of imports).23
23. See appendix A for more precise definitions and sources.138 Pierre-Richard Agénor
I have discussed at length elsewhere the rationale for considering
these variables (see Agénor, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a), so only a brief justi-
fication is offered here. Inflation (which is a tax on nonindexed financial
assets, such as currency holdings) lowers the overall purchasing power of
households and tends to raise poverty. An increase in real GDP per capita
is expected to be negatively correlated with the poverty rate. The effect of
a real exchange rate depreciation is ambiguous. It may lead to a reduc-
tion in poverty if it benefits small farmers in the tradable sector (as is the
case in many low-income developing countries); but overall poverty may
increase if the depreciation is accompanied by a significant increase in
the cost-of-living index in urban areas (as a result of a rise in the domestic
price of imported goods). The average tariff rate is a proxy for the degree
of trade openness, or “real” globalization, and is expected to have a nonlin-
ear effect on poverty (see Agénor, 2004a): to the extent that trade liberal-
ization entails short-run adjustment costs (as a result of a reduction in
employment in import-substitution industries, for instance), poverty may
rise initially; over time, as liberalization progresses and tariffs continue
to fall, the expansion of employment in export industries may lead to
lower poverty. This is tested by using both the average tariff rate and its
squared value as regressors. The tariff rate itself is expected to have a
negative effect on poverty, whereas its squared value is expected to have
a positive effect.
The data on poverty rates are taken from the World Bank and cover
countries for which data on the unemployment rate are simultaneously
available from the ILO, with at least two observations available for each
country. These requirements give a relatively small sample, consisting
of eleven countries and forty observations (see appendix A). The first
estimation method that I use is ordinary least squares (OLS) with fixed
effects. The results are reported in table 1, columns 1 and 2 for the
headcount index and columns 4 and 5 for the poverty gap. The difference
between columns 1 and 2 and columns 4 and 5 is that the change in the
real exchange rate, and the volatility measure based on it, are entered
separately, because of colinearity between the variables. The results
are very similar, however. Inflation raises poverty, whereas higher in-
come per capita tends to reduce it. A real exchange rate depreciation
and a high degree of real exchange rate volatility both tend to increase
poverty. The tariff rate and its squared values have the expected sign—
increased trade openness (a reduction in tariffs) tends to increase pov-
erty at first and then reduces it beyond a certain threshold, a result
consistent with the globalization-poverty curve discussed by Agénor
(2004a) in a more general setting. The open unemployment rate also
appears to have a nonmonotonic effect on poverty: lower unemploymentUnemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 139
is associated with higher poverty, but an opposite effect kicks in at levels
of unemployment of 0.033/(2*0.002) = 8.3 percent for the headcount in-
dex and 0.01/(2*0.001) = 5 percent for the poverty gap (regressions 1 and
4). These results corroborate at much smaller levels those shown in
figure 8, which are based on a simple cross-section regression.24 But
again, caution is needed in interpreting the positive segment of the curve,
given the small number of data points in that range.
To account for possible simultaneity problems with the control vari-
ables, I also used an instrumental variables procedure (together with
fixed effects). In the first step, inflation, unemployment, income per capita,
and the rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate (or the index of
volatility based on it) were all regressed on the lagged values of each
variable at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, as well as on the tariff rate and its
squared value. In the second step, the predicted values from these re-
gressions were introduced in the poverty regression, together with lin-
ear and quadratic terms in the tariff rate. The estimation results are
shown in columns 3 and 6 for the two measures of poverty and the per-
centage change in the real exchange rate. By and large, the estimates
obtained with OLS are unaffected, except that the real exchange rate
variable loses some of its significance. Most importantly for the issue at
hand, the degree of significance of the coefficients on the unemployment
rate and its squared value, as well as their size, increases. This implies
slightly higher threshold levels for the unemployment rate to be posi-
tively correlated with poverty: 0.091/(2*0.05) = 9.1 percent for the
headcount index and 0.028/(2*0.002) = 7.0 percent for the output gap.
Finally, I reran all the regressions using the employment ratio (as
measured by the share of employment in total population) instead of
the open unemployment rate, on the grounds that employment and
total population are measured with a greater degree of precision than
the labor force—perhaps because of the difficulty of accurately mea-
suring changes in participation rates. The results, shown in table 2,
are very similar to those reported in table 1, except for the fact that
the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms in the employment
ratio have the opposite sign (as expected), and the quadratic term in
the employment ratio, when the poverty gap is used and the instru-
mental variables methodology is applied, is only borderline significant.
24. The difference is that the cross-section regression attempts to explain the
cross-country variation in poverty rates on the basis of the independent variables
only, whereas the panel regressions explain some of the variation through sepa-
rate intercepts (or fixed effects). The coefficient of the quadratic term in the panel
regressions is determined with greater precision than in the cross-section regres-
sion, owing to the larger number of observations.Headcount poverty index Poverty gap
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a. The dependent variable is the headcount poverty index in regressions 1 through 3 (that is, the ratio of population
earning less than USD 1.08 per day) and the poverty gap in regressions 4 through 6 (that is, the mean shortfall
from the poverty line of USD 1.08 per day, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line). The estimation technique
is ordinary least squares with fixed effects in regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5 and two-stage least squares with fixed
effects in regressions 3 and 6. UNEMP is the rate of unemployment; UNEMP_SQ is its squared value. IVUNEMP
is the instrumental variable of UNEMP (fitted values obtained by regressing UNEMP on the growth rate of GDP
per capita (purchasing power parity) at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, TARIFF, and TARIFF_SQ). IVUNEMP_SQ is the
squared value of  IVUNEMP. INFL is the annual change in the consumer price index. IVINFL is the instrumental
variable of INFL (fitted values obtained by regressing INFL on INFL at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, TARIFF, and
TARIFF_SQ). REALEX is the annual change in the real effective exchange rate index (a rise is a depreciation).
IVREALEX is the instrumental variable of REALEX (fitted values obtained by regressing REALEX on REALEX
at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, TARIFF, and TARIFF_SQ). VREALXL is the volatility measure of the real effective exchange
rate, calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation of the variable for t, t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3 to the average value
for the same period. LGDPPC is the log of the GDP per capita (purchasing power parity). IVLGDPPC is the
instrumental variable of LGDPPC (fitted values obtained by regressing LGDPPC on LGDPPC at t-1, t-2 and t-3,
TARIFF, and TARIFF_SQ). TARIFF is the average tariff rate and TARIFF_SQ is its squared value; t statistics are
in parentheses.Headcount poverty index Poverty gap
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a. The dependent variable is the headcount poverty index in regressions 1 through 3 (that is, the ratio of population
earning less than USD 1.08 per day) and the poverty gap in regressions 4 through 6 (that is, the mean shortfall
from the poverty line of USD 1.08 per day, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line). The estimation technique
is ordinary least squares with fixed effects in regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5 and two-stage least squares with fixed
effects in regressions 3 and 6.  EMP is the ratio of employment to total population; EMP_SQ is its squared value.
IVEMP is the instrumental variable of EMP (fitted values obtained by regressing EMP on the lagged values of
EMP at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, TARIFF, and TARIFF_SQ). IVEMP_SQ is the squared value of  IVEMP. INFL is the
annual change in the consumer price index. IVINFL is the instrumental variable of INFL (fitted values obtained
by regressing INFL on INFL at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, TARIFF, and TARIFF_SQ). REALEX the annual change in the
real effective exchange rate index (a rise is a depreciation). IVREALEX is the instrumental variable of REALEX
(fitted values obtained by regressing REALEX on REALEX at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, TARIFF, and TARIFF_SQ).
VREALXL is the volatility measure of the real effective exchange rate, calculated as the ratio of the standard
deviation of the variable for t, t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3 to the average value for the same period. LGDPPC is the log of
the GDP per capita (purchasing power parity). IVLGDPPC is the instrumental variable of LGDPPC (fitted values
obtained by regressing LGDPPC on LGDPPC at t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3, TARIFF, and TARIFF_SQ). TARIFF is the
average tariff rate and TARIFF_SQ is its squared value; t statistics are in parentheses.142 Pierre-Richard Agénor
Overall, therefore, the results suggest that when unemployment
is below a threshold of about 10 percent, a tradeoff seems to exist
between poverty and unemployment across countries. The next step
would be to determine the exact source of this tradeoff—for instance,
changes in labor market regulations during the sample period, as
suggested by the model of Bean and Pissarides (1993) discussed ear-
lier. This could be done by estimating a simultaneous equations sys-
tem in unemployment and poverty rates, with the explicit introduction
of an index of labor market regulations and other variables likely to
affect unemployment (such as the presence of a binding minimum
wage or a compensation scheme for the unemployed).
3. A STRUCTURAL APPROACH
Another approach that can be used to gauge the extent to which
poverty-unemployment tradeoffs are important, depending on the ori-
gin of shocks, is to use a numerical model and perform relevant simu-
lations. I do so here with the Mini Integrated Macroeconomic Model
For Poverty Analysis (mini-IMMPA) model, which was developed at
the World Bank to quantify poverty reduction strategies in developing
countries.25 An appealing feature of the model is its detailed treatment
of the labor market and the sources of unemployment in a typical de-
veloping-country context. I first describe the macroeconomic compo-
nent of the model, emphasizing the production side and the structure
of the labor market, and explain briefly how it is linked to a household
survey for poverty analysis. Other features of the model (such as the
composition of aggregate demand, the determination of prices, and the
distribution of income flows) are briefly summarized in appendix B. I
then report simulation results associated with two types of labor mar-
ket reforms: a cut in the minimum wage and a reduction in payroll
taxes on unskilled labor in the formal sector.
3.1 Production and the Labor Market
The structure of production and the labor market in Mini-IMMPA
are summarized in figure 9. Production activities take place in both
25. See Agénor (2003), Agénor and El Aynaoui (2003), Agénor, Izquierdo, and
Fofack (2003), Agénor, Fernandes, and Haddad (2003), and Agénor and others
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rural and urban areas. The rural sector produces only one good, which
is sold either on domestic markets or abroad. Urban production in-
cludes both formal and informal components; in addition, the urban
formal economy is separated between production of private and public
goods. Gross output of each type of good is given by the sum of value-
added and intermediate consumption. Value-added in the rural sector
is assumed to be produced with land (which is in fixed supply) and a
composite factor, which consists of unskilled labor and public capital.
Value added in the urban informal sector depends only on labor and is
subject to decreasing returns to scale. Value-added in the public sector
is measured by the government wage bill, and employment is exog-
enous. Private formal production uses as inputs both skilled and un-
skilled labor, as well as public and private capital. Skilled labor and
private physical capital have a higher degree of complementarity (lower
degree of substitution) than the physical capital-skilled labor bundle
with unskilled labor. Firms in the urban formal sector are subject to a
payroll tax on unskilled labor.
Unskilled workers are employed in both the rural and urban sec-
tors, whereas skilled workers are employed only in the urban formal
economy. Wages in the rural and urban informal sectors adjust to
equilibrate supply and demand. Unskilled workers in the urban
economy may be employed in either the formal sector, in which case
they are paid the minimum wage, or the informal economy, where
they receive the going wage. The nominal wage for skilled labor in
the private sector is determined on the basis of a monopoly union
approach, as in Agénor (2005). The consumption real wage is set by a
representative labor union, whose objective is to maximize a utility
function that depends on deviations of both employment and the con-
sumption wage from their target levels, subject to the firm’s labor
demand schedule. The union’s target wage is related negatively to
the skilled unemployment rate. Education is a pure public good; the
flow of unskilled workers who become skilled is a function of the
effective number of teachers in the public sector and the stock of
public capital in education.
Incentives to rural-urban migration depend on the differential
between expected rural and urban wages, as in Harris and Todaro
(1970). The expected (unskilled) urban wage is a weighted average of
the minimum wage in the formal sector and the going wage in the
informal sector. The degree of mobility of the unskilled labor force
between the formal and informal sectors is also imperfect and is a
function of expected income opportunities. The supply of labor in theFigure 9. Production Structure and the Labor Market
Source: Agénor (2003).Unemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 145
informal economy is obtained by subtracting the number of unskilled
job seekers in the urban formal sector from the urban unskilled labor
force, which increases as a result of natural urban population growth
and migration from the rural economy and which falls because some
unskilled workers acquire skills and leave the unskilled labor force to
increase the supply of skilled labor.
3.2 Link with a Household Survey
The procedure followed here to assess the poverty effects of policy
shocks involves linking the structural macroeconomic component de-
scribed earlier to a household income and expenditure survey, in order
to calculate both the headcount index and the poverty gap. This proce-
dure, which is discussed at length in Agénor, Chen, and Grimm (2004)
and Agénor, Izquierdo, and Fofack (2003), involves six steps. The first
step is to classify the data in the household survey into the five catego-
ries of households contained in the macroeconomic framework—work-
ers in the rural sector, unskilled workers in the urban informal sector,
unskilled workers in the urban formal sector, skilled workers in the
urban formal sector, and profit earners (see appendix B).
The second step is to initiate a shock and then generate the subse-
quent real growth rates in real per capita consumption and disposable
income for all categories of households, up to the end of the simulation
horizon. The third step is to apply these growth rates separately to the
per capita (disposable) income and consumption expenditure for each
household in the survey. This gives a new vector of absolute income
and consumption levels for each individual in each group.
The fourth step is to update the initial rural and urban poverty
lines to reflect increases in rural and urban price indexes and then to
calculate poverty indicators using the new vector of absolute levels of
income and consumption. The fifth step uses employment and unem-
ployment growth rates to adjust the composition of the sample of
each household group, as given in the survey. Finally, the sixth step
is to compare the post-shock poverty indicators with the baseline val-
ues to assess the impact of the shock on the poor.
3.3 Policy Shocks
This subsection examines the poverty and employment effects of
two types of labor market reforms: a cut in the minimum wage and a
reduction in the payroll tax rate on unskilled labor paid by firms in146 Pierre-Richard Agénor
the private formal sector. Discussions of the employment effects of changes
in minimum wages and the taxation of labor figure prominently in the
recent debate on labor market reforms in developing countries (see, for
instance, Agénor, 2004b; World Bank, 2004). Assessing whether these
policies may entail tradeoffs between unemployment reduction and pov-
erty alleviation is thus timely. In both simulations, I consider only perma-
nent shocks and focus on the first ten periods after the shock. For the
payroll tax experiment, I consider three alternative budget financing rules:
domestic borrowing with no offsetting tax change; and offsetting, revenue-
neutral increases in either sales taxes on private formal sector goods or
income taxes on profit earners.26 In all of these experiments, the govern-
ment borrows domestically to finance its deficit, and private capital forma-
tion is determined residually to maintain a continuous equilibrium between
aggregate savings and investment.27
Reduction in the Minimum Wage
Simulation results associated with a 10 percent reduction in the
minimum wage are shown in table 3, which displays absolute per-
centage changes from the baseline solution of unemployment (both
skilled and unskilled) and poverty rates (for informal sector house-
holds, formal unskilled households, and formal skilled households),
as measured by the poverty gap.
The impact (or first year) effect of the reduction in the minimum
wage is an increase in the demand for unskilled labor in the private
sector on the order of 4.3 percent. The increase in demand is met by
the existing pool of unskilled workers seeking employment in the
urban sector. As a result, the unskilled unemployment rate drops
significantly, by 2.9 percentage points in the first year. The cut in the
minimum wage reduces the relative cost of unskilled labor, which
leads to substitution among production factors not only on impact but
also over time. Because unskilled labor has a relatively high elastic-
ity of substitution with respect to the composite factor consisting of
skilled labor and physical capital, the reduced cost of that category of
labor gives private firms in the formal sector a fairly strong incentive
26. The calibration procedure and parameter values used in these simulations
are described in appendix C. Detailed tables summarizing the simulation results
are available on request.
27. How this transfer of private savings to the government takes place is not
explicitly specified; one can think of a pure financial intermediary operating in the
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to substitute away from skilled labor and physical capital. The fall in
the demand for that category of labor puts downward pressure on
skilled wages, which drop by 1.6 percent in the first period. On im-
pact, labor supply is fixed in the rural and informal sectors, so the
level of employment does not change in either sector—and neither
does the level of activity (that is, real value-added in both sectors is
constant). The rise in real disposable income and real consumption of
rural and informal sector households leads to higher value-added prices
and higher wages in both sectors. Value-added prices go up by slightly
more than wages in the second and subsequent periods, implying a
fall in the product wage in both sectors and a rise in employment.
Over time, changes in wage differentials affect both rural-urban
and formal-informal migration flows and, therefore, the supply of la-
bor in the various production sectors. The expected unskilled wage in
the formal economy is constant on impact. Despite the increase in
unskilled employment in the private sector in the first period (imply-
ing a higher perceived probability of finding a job in that sector), the
fall in the minimum wage is large enough to entail a reduction in the
urban expected wage. At the same time, rural sector wages rise,
thereby magnifying the fall in the expected urban-rural wage differ-
ential. In the second period, the drop in this differential (measured as
a proportion of the rural wage) is 8.7 percentage points; it persists
over time, although it narrows somewhat. As a result, the inflow of
unskilled workers in the informal sector (measured as a proportion
of the total supply of unskilled labor in the urban sector) falls by
about 1.2 percentage points in periods 2 and 3. The reduction in the
labor supply leads, in turn, to an increase in informal sector wages
throughout the adjustment period. This increase in the informal sec-
tor wage, coupled with the reduction in the minimum wage (as well
as the expected wage in the private urban formal sector, despite the
higher employment probability), leads to a sharp drop in period 2 in
the expected formal-informal wage differential. As a result, the num-
ber of unskilled workers willing to queue for employment in the for-
mal private sector falls. The reduction in the number of job seekers,
together with the sustained effect of the cut in the minimum wage on
labor demand, explains the large impact on unemployment, which
averages about 11 percent in the long run.28
28. Unskilled employment in the formal (private) sector increases by about 10
percent in the long run, whereas the number of unskilled job seekers in the
formal economy drops by 4.5 percent.Simulated policy, affected Period
variable, and sectora (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)























Table 3. Simulation Results
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Although the behavior of nominal wages in the rural sector essen-
tially reflects changes in value-added prices on impact, over time it is
also affected by changes in output (induced by changes in households’
disposable income and expenditure) and migration flows. After an ini-
tial increase in nominal wages, lower migration flows to urban areas
begin to put downward pressure on rural wages, which end up falling
(in nominal terms) by slightly less than 2 percent after ten years. As
indicated earlier, the reduction in the cost of unskilled labor induces a
substitution away from skilled labor, which brings a sustained fall in
skilled wages in nominal terms. The overall effect on labor demand is
not large; skilled employment in the private formal sector falls in the
long run only slightly. Because the supply of skilled labor remains
roughly constant throughout (public investment in education and the
number of school teachers are held constant at their baseline values),
the increase in the skilled unemployment rate (of about 0.3 percentage
points in the long run) mirrors the drop in employment. The reason for
the small effect on skilled employment is that the direct substitution
effect associated with the reduction in the minimum wage is mitigated
by a fall in the skilled wage, resulting from general equilibrium effects.
The drop in the nominal skilled wage is larger than the fall in the
value-added price of the private urban formal sector, implying a drop
in the product wage. This, in turn, stimulates the demand for that
category of labor.
Changes in real consumption and disposable income lead to sig-
nificant differences in poverty patterns among urban households. As
shown in table 3, poverty drops by 1.5 percentage points for informal
sector households on impact, but it increases for both categories of
workers in the formal sector (by 1.0 and 0.3 percentage points, re-
spectively, for skilled and unskilled households). In the long run, pov-
erty falls for unskilled workers in both the informal and formal sectors,
whereas the slight increase in poverty recorded on impact for skilled
workers persists. For that group of workers, the behavior of poverty
tends to mirror the behavior of unemployment. Thus, the simulation
results suggest the existence of a potential short-run tradeoff between
unemployment and poverty: although the reduction in the minimum
wage raises unskilled employment in the formal sector, it also in-
creases poverty for households employed in that sector. Moreover, a
longer-run tradeoff could potentially result from the fact that poverty
among skilled workers increases (albeit slightly) in both the short
and long term.Unemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 151
Cut in Payroll Tax on Unskilled Labor
Simulation results associated with a 10 percentage point reduction
in the payroll tax rate on unskilled labor are also shown in table 3. The
results correspond, as noted earlier, to three alternative budget financ-
ing rules: a nonneutral change involving domestic borrowing with no
offsetting tax change; a revenue-neutral change on impact involving
an increase in sales taxes on private formal sector goods; and a rev-
enue-neutral change implying an offsetting increase in income taxes
on profit earners.
Consider first the nonneutral experiment. The impact effect of a
reduction in the payroll tax rate is qualitatively similar to a cut in the
minimum wage, as discussed earlier: by reducing the effective cost of
unskilled labor, it tends to increase immediately the demand for that
category of labor. The unskilled unemployment rate drops by 0.9 per-
centage point in the first year and by an average of 2.5 percentage
points in the long run. The reduction in the effective cost of unskilled
labor also leads firms in the private urban formal sector to substitute
away from skilled labor and physical capital, causing skilled employ-
ment to fall by about the same amount as in the previous experi-
ment. The behavior of the (expected) urban-rural wage differential
follows a pattern qualitatively similar to the one described in the
previous experiment, although the magnitude of the initial effects
are not as large. Most importantly, the expected formal-informal wage
differential now increases in the second period. The reason is that
the minimum wage does not change this time around, and the expan-
sion in unskilled employment in the private formal sector raises the
probability of finding a job there, thereby increasing the expected
formal sector wage. The number of unskilled job seekers in the for-
mal economy therefore increases, which explains why the reduction
in the unemployment rate is significantly lower than in the previous
case.29 Changes in poverty among urban household groups follows a
similar pattern as before. The long-run reduction in poverty in the
informal sector is less marked, however, largely because wages do
not increase by the same amount—the fall in open unskilled unem-
ployment is less dramatic, so fewer workers seek employment in the
formal sector. The impact effect on poverty among formal unskilled
29. This time, unskilled employment in the formal (private) sector increases
by about 7.5 percent in the long run, but the number of unskilled job seekers in
the formal economy increases as well, by 2.8 percent.152 Pierre-Richard Agénor
households is about the same, so the same type of tradeoffs identified
earlier emerge.
Consider now the case in which the effect of the payroll tax cut on
overall tax revenue is offset by either an increase in sales taxes on
private formal sector goods or an increase in taxation of profit earners.
In both cases, the impact and longer-run effects of the shock are quali-
tatively similar to those described earlier, although their magnitude
differs. In particular, movements in the informal sector wage are less
pronounced, in part because changes in rural-urban migration flows
are not as large. The most important difference is that when the cut in
payroll taxes is financed by an initial increase in income taxes, the fall
in unskilled unemployment is larger in both the short and the long
term, because the reduction in the after-tax rate of return on invest-
ment lowers the demand for physical capital, which has a high degree
of substitution with unskilled labor. The reduction in poverty among
informal and formal unskilled households and the increase in poverty
among skilled households are also both larger on impact. Moreover, the
long-run impact on poverty among formal unskilled households is neg-
ligible with an increase in sales taxes, whereas the long-run effects
remain quite significant (and are even stronger for skilled households)
with an increase in income taxes. As in the nonneutral experiment,
poverty increases among skilled households but falls among unskilled
households (both formal and informal). Unemployment among skilled
workers rises at the same time that it falls among the unskilled.
Overall, the results indicate that there may be short- and longer-
term tradeoffs between unemployment reduction and poverty allevia-
tion among household groups. The magnitude of these tradeoffs depends
on the nature of the financing rule that accompanies the shocks. While
the results are specific to the policy shocks examined here (as well as
to the nature of the model and the parameter values chosen for its
calibration), one may surmise that these tradeoffs are more than mere
curiosities and may well occur with other types of policy changes.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this paper has been to discuss analytically and
assess empirically the potential short- and long-term tradeoffs that
may arise between reducing poverty and lowering unemployment in
developing countries. The first part provided a general discussion of
the channels through which such tradeoffs may arise. The discussionUnemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 153
noted that the expansion in employment (resulting from either favor-
able productivity shocks or lower wages) may be skewed toward
low-paying jobs, and as long as the labor supply does not increase
significantly, the increase in the numbers of working poor may trans-
late into both lower unemployment and higher poverty. Furthermore,
poverty and unemployment are both endogenous variables, and the
correlation between them may depend on the type of shocks affecting
the economy, either over time or across countries. This general propo-
sition was illustrated in a growth context using a simple overlapping-
generations model based on Bean and Pissarides (1993). In the model,
unemployment is created by matching frictions in the labor market.
The analysis showed that an increase in workers’ bargaining power
leads to higher wages, which discourages firms from opening new
vacancies. This tends to raise unemployment. At the same time, a
higher income for workers increases savings, which can stimulate
growth and reduce poverty (assuming that growth is distribution neu-
tral). The net effect on the pool of savings cannot be determined a
priori—and thus neither can the effect on growth and unemployment.
Nevertheless, the model can generate an inverse correlation between
unemployment and poverty as a result of this type of shock.
The second part of the paper used two econometric techniques to
assess empirically the relevance of these tradeoffs: a VAR framework
and cross-country regressions. Impulse response functions derived
from VAR models estimated for Brazil and Chile showed no short-run
tradeoff between these variables, for neither output nor wage shocks.
However, improvements in the quality of the data used, and the ap-
plication of more sophisticated forms of VAR models, could deliver
different results. The regression results, by contrast, show a nega-
tive relation between unemployment and poverty (as long as unem-
ployment is below a certain threshold), even after controlling for various
other determinants of poverty (such as inflation, real income per capita,
changes in the real exchange rate, macroeconomic volatility, and the
degree of trade openness), and using different econometric estimation
techniques (specifically, OLS and instrumental variables with fixed
effects).
The third part used a structural macroeconomic model built specifi-
cally for labor market and poverty analysis—namely, the Mini-IMMPA
framework developed by Agénor (2003). Simulation results showed that
labor market reforms can induce both short- and long-run tradeoffs be-
tween the composition of unemployment and poverty. In particular, fol-
lowing a cut in the minimum wage, unskilled unemployment and poverty154 Pierre-Richard Agénor
rates in the formal sector may well move in opposite directions for par-
ticular household groups. Similarly, unskilled unemployment and pov-
erty among urban unskilled households may both fall in the long run,
while skilled unemployment and poverty among urban skilled house-
holds may well increase. A tradeoff may therefore exist across labor cat-
egories. To the extent that such tradeoffs exist, the nature of the social
welfare function (that is, the relative importance of the various labor or
household groups in shaping government preferences) becomes crucial
in choosing a given policy path.Unemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 155
APPENDIX A
Data Sources and Definition of Variables
This appendix first describes the sources of the data for Brazil
and Chile used in this paper. It then lists the countries included in
the regression results presented in tables 1 and 2 and provides a
more precise definition of the variables used in the regressions, with
their respective data sources.
VAR estimates are based on the period 1981–2002 for Brazil and
1981–2001 for Chile. All series are detrended using the modified band-
pass filter proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), as discussed
in the text, and are defined as follows:
Y_CYC is the cyclical component of real GDP calculated as the
log difference of real GDP and its trend component. Data sources for
real GDP are the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
for Brazil, and the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) for Chile.
POVER_CYC represents cyclical components of the poverty gap
(for Brazil) and the urban headcount index (for Chile). For Brazil, the
source is IPEA (www.ipea.gov.br), and for Chile unpublished estimates
by the CBC, which are based on an urban poverty line defined as
twice the cost of a representative basket of food.30
WAGE_CYC is the cyclical component of the real minimum wage
(for Brazil) and the unskilled real wage (for Chile). The source is IPEA
for Brazil and for CBC (based on INE surveys) for Chile.
UNEMP_CYC is the cyclical component of the aggregate unem-
ployment rate (for Brazil), and the unemployment rate in the Santiago
metropolitan area (for Chile). The source is IPEA (from the monthly
employment survey of IBGE) for Brazil and the CBC (based on the
monthly survey of the Universidad de Chile) for Chile.
Regressions are based on the following list of countries (years of
observation on poverty and unemployment rates in parentheses):
Brazil (1985, 1988, 1989, 1993, 1997), Colombia (1988, 1991, 1995, 1996),
Costa Rica (1986, 1990, 1993, 1996), Indonesia (1996, 1998), Mexico
(1992, 1995), Pakistan (1990, 1993, 1996), Peru (1994, 1996), Philip-
pines (1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997), Sri Lanka (1990, 1995), Thailand
(1981, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1998), and Venezuela (1981, 1987, 1989, 1993,
1995, 1996). These countries are all those for which at least two data
points on poverty (as measured by the poverty gap or the headcount
30. An unpublished note (available on request) prepared by Elías Albagli of the
Central Bank of Chile describes these estimates of the poverty rate in more detail.156 Pierre-Richard Agénor
index) and the unemployment rate were simultaneously available in
the ILO and World Bank databases.
The variables used in the regressions are defined as follows:
POV is the poverty gap and headcount index, calculated with a
poverty line of $1.08 a day. Source: World Bank Global Poverty Moni-
toring Database.
UNEMP is the unemployment rate, defined as the ratio of the
labor force that is without work but is available for and seeking em-
ployment, to the total labor force. Source: Key Indicators of the La-
bor Market database (ILO).
INFL is the inflation rate in terms of consumer prices. Source:
WDI.
REALEX is the percentage change in the real effective exchange
rate. A rise is a depreciation. Source: International Financial Statis-
tics, IMF.
LGDPPC is the log of GDP per capita measured at purchasing
power parity exchange rates. Source: WDI.
TARIFF is the average tariff rate, defined as the ratio of import
duties over imports. Source: WDI.Unemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 157
APPENDIX B
Other Features of Mini-IMMPA
This appendix briefly summarizes some of the other features of
Mini-IMMPA, in addition to the production and the labor market struc-
ture described in the text.
Both the informal and public sector goods are nontraded. Total
supply in each sector is thus equal to gross domestic production. Ru-
ral and private urban formal goods, by contrast, compete with im-
ported goods. The supply of the composite good for each of these sectors
consists of a combination of imports and domestically produced goods.
The demand for imported versus domestic rural and private urban
goods is a function of relative domestic and import prices and of the
elasticity of substitution between these goods. Allocation of output of
rural and private urban formal sector goods to exports or the domes-
tic market occurs along each sector’s production possibility frontier.
Efficiency conditions require that firms equate the domestic-export
relative price to the opportunity cost in production.
For the rural and informal sectors, aggregate demand consists
only of intermediate consumption and demand for final consumption
(by both the government and the private sector), whereas aggregate
demand for the public and private goods consists, in addition, of in-
vestment demand. Total demand for intermediate consumption of
any good is the sum of the share of this good in the consumption of
other sectors. Final consumption for each production sector is the
summation across all categories of households of nominal consump-
tion of this sector’s good. Total investment by urban firms consists of
purchases of private urban formal goods only.
The net or value-added price of output is given by the gross price
net of indirect taxes, less the cost of intermediate inputs. World prices
of imported and exported goods are exogenously given. The domestic
currency price of these goods is obtained by multiplying the world
price by the exchange rate, with import prices also adjusted by the
tariff rate. Because the transformation function between exports and
domestic sales of the rural and private urban goods is linearly homo-
geneous, the domestic sales prices are derived from the sum of ex-
port and domestic expenditure on rural and private goods in nominal
terms divided by the quantity produced of these goods. For the infor-
mal and public sectors, the composite price is equal to the domestic
market price, which is in turn equal to the output price. For the
rural sector and private urban production, the substitution function158 Pierre-Richard Agénor
between imports and domestic goods is also linearly homogeneous, and
the composite market price is determined accordingly by the expendi-
ture identity. The nested production function of private urban formal
goods is once again linearly homogeneous; prices of the composite in-
puts are derived in a similar fashion. The price of capital is equal to the
price of private urban formal goods, because investment expenditure
involves only purchases of that category of goods (as noted earlier).
Consumption price indices for the rural sector and for urban unskilled
and skilled workers are defined as weighted averages of prices of com-
posite goods, with weights reflecting the share of these goods in each
group’s consumption basket.
Firms’ profits in all sectors are defined as revenue minus total
labor costs. Firms’ income in the rural and informal sectors is equal
to their profits, whereas firms’ income in the urban formal economy
is equal to their profits minus corporate taxes and interest payments
on foreign loans. Household income consists of salaries, distributed
profits, and government transfers. Households are defined according
to both the type of labor and their sector of location, which yields five
categories: workers in the rural sector, workers in the urban infor-
mal sector, skilled workers in the urban formal sector, unskilled
workers in the urban formal sector, and profit earners. The rural
household comprises all workers employed in the rural sector. The
urban informal household consists of workers in the informal sector.
The unskilled (skilled) urban formal household consists of all unskilled
(skilled) workers employed in the formal sector, both public and pri-
vate. Households in the rural sector and in the urban informal economy
own the firms in which they are employed. Income of rural sector
households is thus equal to the sum of production revenue and trans-
fers from the government. Income of the urban formal skilled and
unskilled households depends on government transfers and salaries.
Firms provide no direct income, because these groups do not own the
production units in which they are employed. Firms in the private
urban sector retain a portion of their after-tax earnings to finance
investment, and they transfer the remainder to profit earners (who
also receive transfer payments).
Each category of households saves a constant fraction of its dispos-
able income, which is equal to total income minus income tax pay-
ments. The portion of disposable income that is not saved is allocated
to consumption. The accumulation of capital over time depends on the
flow level of investment and the depreciation rate. The aggregate iden-
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be equal to total savings, equal to firms’ after-tax retained earnings,
total after-tax household savings, government savings, and foreign
borrowing by firms. In the simulations reported in the text, this equa-
tion is solved residually for the level of private investment.
All value added in the production of public goods is distributed as
wages. Government expenditures consist of government consump-
tion and public investment, which consists of investment in infra-
structure, education, and health. Infrastructure and health capital
affect the production process in the private sector, as they both com-
bine to produce the stock of public capital. Tax revenues consist of
revenue generated by import tariffs, sales taxes, income taxes (on
both households and firms in the private urban sector), and payroll
taxes. Thus, the fiscal deficit is equal to tax revenue minus transfer
payments, current expenditure on goods and services, total wage pay-
ments, and total investment expenditure. Finally, the external con-
straint implies that any current account surplus (or deficit) must be
compensated by a net flow of foreign capital, given by the change in
private and public foreign borrowing. This is obtained by an adjust-
ment of the real exchange rate.160 Pierre-Richard Agénor
APPENDIX C
Calibration and Parameter Values
This appendix presents the characteristics of the data underlying
the calibration procedure for the Mini-IMMPA prototype described in
the text (see Agénor, 2003). The basic data set consists of a social
accounting matrix (SAM) and a set of initial levels and lagged vari-
ables. The SAM encompasses twenty-seven accounts, including pro-
duction and retail sectors (four accounts), labor production factors
and profits (three accounts), enterprises (one account), households
(five accounts), government current expenditures and taxes (nine ac-
counts), government investment expenditures (three accounts), pri-
vate investment spending (one account), and the rest of the world
(one account). The data satisfy the double-entry accounting principle
and can therefore be used to initialize model variables and calibrate
level parameters, such as effective tax rates.
The characteristics of the SAM data and other data (including ini-
tial labor market quantities and debt and capital stocks) are summa-
rized as follows. On the output side, agriculture and the informal sector
account for 12 and 35 percent of total output, respectively. On the
demand side, private current and capital expenditures account for 78
percent of GDP, whereas overall government expenditures account
for 18 percent of GDP. The economy has a balanced current account
but runs a trade surplus, amounting to 4 percent of GDP, to finance
foreign interest payments.
Total investment expenditures amount to 22 percent of GDP, and
the private sector account for two-thirds of these outlays. This im-
plies that investment spending accounts for 19 percent of private ex-
penditures and 40 percent of public expenditures. The public sector
investment budget allocates 30 percent of expenditures to investment
in the health sector, 30 percent to investment in the education sec-
tor, and 40 percent to investment in infrastructure. Furthermore,
the public sector wage bill makes up 30 percent of overall public sec-
tor expenditures. The government is assumed to run a balanced bud-
get in the base period and thus does not resort to domestic or foreign
borrowing. Sales taxes and import tariffs make up more than 70 per-
cent of total government revenues, whereas private income and cor-
porate taxes account for less than 20 percent of revenues.
The trade balance is dominated by nonagricultural imports and
exports. Agricultural exports account for only 8 percent of total export
earnings, whereas nonagricultural imports account for 92 percent ofUnemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 161
total imports. The level of trade openness (measured by the ratio of the
sum of imports and exports to GDP) amounts to a moderate 40 percent.
Because the economy runs a balanced current account in the base pe-
riod, there is no private or public foreign borrowing. Nevertheless, the
stock of external debt in the base period amounts to 51 percent of GDP
(or 233 percent of export earnings), whereas foreign interest payments
amount to 4 percent of GDP (or 18 percent of exports earnings).
Rural areas account for 29 percent of the total labor force, and the
rest is concentrated in urban areas. Altogether, 47 percent of the work-
ers are employed in some kind of urban informal occupation, whereas
only 22 percent of the labor force is employed in the urban formal sec-
tor. Open unemployment among urban formal workers amounts to 2
percent of the total labor force. The formal labor force consists of 58
percent unskilled workers and 42 percent skilled workers, and unem-
ployment rates are 10 percent among formal unskilled workers and 8
percent among skilled workers. Migration from rural to urban areas
amounts to 1.3 percent of the rural population, and the urban-rural
wage differential amounts to 54 percent of the rural wage. In compari-
son, unskilled labor migration from the informal to the formal sector
amounts to 0.8 percent of the informal sector labor force, and the for-
mal-informal wage differential amounts to 106 percent of the informal
wage.
Seventeen elasticity parameters, which cannot be derived from the
calibration procedure, have to be estimated. These parameters include
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in rural agricultural and pri-
vate formal production (four parameters); CES Armington elasticities
and constant elasticity of transformation (CET) for aggregating domes-
tic composite goods and transforming domestic production (four pa-
rameters); elasticities related to rural-urban, and formal-informal sector
migration (two parameters); elasticities related to the computation of
ordinary and congested government capital (two parameters); the elas-
ticity of effort by teachers and the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital in skill upgrading (two parameters); the elasticities
related to determination of skilled labor wages (two parameters); and
the elasticity of investment with respect to the desired private capital
stock (one parameter). In addition, a set of minimum consumption
levels (fifteen parameters) has to be determined, because they simi-
larly cannot be derived from the calibration procedure.
The substitution elasticity between labor and government capital
in rural production is set at 0.7, whereas elasticities in the nested
private, formal sector production structure range from 0.7 between162 Pierre-Richard Agénor
skilled labor and capital to 1.2 between the skilled labor-capital bundle
and unskilled labor. Import and export elasticities are uniformly set
at 0.7 for agriculture and 1.5 for the private urban formal sector.
This is again meant to reflect a lower-middle-income economy with
low agricultural potential. The elasticity of rural-urban migration with
respect to the relative rural-urban wage-differential is set at 0.4, while
the elasticity of formal-informal migration with respect to the for-
mal-informal wage ratio is set at 0.8.
The substitution parameter between infrastructure and health capi-
tal stocks are set at 0.5, and congestion is assumed to be absent (zero
elasticity). The substitution elasticity between teachers and public capi-
tal in education in the production of skilled labor is set at 0.3, while the
effort elasticity with respect to the relative wage ratio—a specification
that follows Agénor and Aizenman (1999)—is set to 0.8. Furthermore,
skilled wages in the private urban formal sector are assumed to be
affected only by the skilled unemployment rate, with an elasticity of –
2.0. Finally, the elasticity of private investment with respect to the
desired growth rate of the private capital stock is set at 0.3.
Among the remaining parameters, the foreign interest rate on
private borrowing is calibrated to 3.8 percent, while the public for-
eign interest rate is calibrated to 4.9 percent. In addition, the initial
depreciation rates are calibrated to 6.4 percent for private capital and
3.9-5.8 percent for public capital (depending on whether investment
is in education, health, or infrastructure).
Turning to the government budget, output and value-added tax
rates range from 3.0 to 3.7 percent, whereas the tax rate on sales of
the private urban formal sector and the payroll tax rate paid by firms
in that sector are calibrated to 12.1 and 20.1 percent, respectively.
Import tariffs range from 34 percent on private formal sector goods
to 167 percent on agricultural goods, reflecting a country with signifi-
cant protection on agriculture. Finally, the corporate income tax rate
is set at 7.6 percent, while income tax rates on households range
from 2.2–3.9 percent for rural agricultural and urban unskilled groups
to 9.6–12.5 percent for the urban skilled group and capitalists-rentiers.
As noted in the text, workers in the urban informal sector do not pay
income taxes.Unemployment-Poverty Tradeoffs 163
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